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Introduction: a shortcut to “social justice” 
As the title suggests, the present paper deals with the concept of “social justice”. 
However, along the paper this concept is used in a rather peculiar fashion. Alas, this 
difference by no means implies an innovative way to look at “social justice”. Instead, I 
will deploy a simplistic approach to such a concept, that is, a positivist approach. Hence, 
this paper builds on the assumption that “social justice”, whatever fundamental 
definition of the concept one might accept, should include the respect of internationally 
agreed standards of protection of social rights. For all its simplicity, bordering on 
banality, this approach has three interesting perks for the present paper. First, the said 
simplicity allows the definition to avoid the inextricable conundrum of more normative 
and political debates surrounding the concept of “social justice”. Second, the proposed 
definition is in itself dynamic as long as international texts setting the standards of 
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protection of social rights are provided with supervisory/monitoring mechanism
2
. Third, 
in respect of the context of the European Union, the level of protection awarded to 
social rights by international instruments has often been considered as a minimum floor 
of protection. Implicitly or explicitly, the level of social protection reached by EU 
member states was considered as going beyond those minima
3
. However, during the 
recent years (2007 onwards) the action of EU institutions has brought several Member 
States to violate the standards of protection of social rights set in international 
documents, such as ILO Conventions and the European Social Charter. On the 
background of the previously identified understanding, this situation should provide the 
necessary shock to urge political and institutional actors to restore the respect of the said 
international standards. 
The reference to “internationally agreed standards of protection of social rights” 
obviously requires the identification of those standards. In particular, it requires a choice 
in terms of which international instruments to consider as a useful source. In the context 
of this paper I will refer to the Conventions elaborated in the context of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and to the European Social Charter (ESC
4
) as sources of 
standards of protection of social rights. 
Both the ILO and the ESC are (relatively) well known, so that a specific 
introduction is not necessary at this point. However, a few elements are worth stressing 
in connection with the present research. First of all, the Constitution of the ILO
5
, 
explicitly refers to the concept of “social justice” as the necessary basis for universal 
and lasting peace. The expression is repeated in the so-called Declaration of 
Philadelphia
6
, annexed to the Constitution
7
. More recently (2008), the ILO adopted the 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. As for the two previous 
occurrences however, the concept “social justice” is not defined by the document. Still, 
it is interesting in the context of this paper to note that the 2008 Declaration includes the 
concept as the fundamental yardstick on which to measure “all international economic 
and financial policies”. On the contrary, the text of the ESC never refers to the wording 
“social justice”. 
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3 
Coming to the dynamic aspect one has to turn briefly to supervisory and 
monitoring bodies characterising the ILO and the ESC. Both systems feature a reporting 
system regarding the implementation of respective standards of protection of social 
rights. The ILO body examining the application of ratified Conventions is the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR)
8
. On the ESC side, the monitoring is ensured by the European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR)
9
. Parallel to the monitoring procedure, the ILO has a number of 
“special procedures” and also provides for the possibility to lodge complaints10. More 
relevant for the present paper, the ECSR is characterised by a “collective complaint 
procedure”11, which entitles a number of employers’ and workers’ associations, as well 
as NGOs to lodge complaints regarding the non-respect of the obligations stemming 
from the ESC. 
1. EU close (and not so close) encounters with the ILO and the ESC 
EU Treaties picture the EU itself as firmly committed to the respect of 
international law
12
. Articles 3(5)
13
 and 21(1)
14
 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
are both a testament to this self-representation. Indeed, this commitment has been 
identified as one of the distinctive characteristics of EU action in the international 
relations
15
.  Evidently, the picture is much more complicated than this black and white 
representation. Looking at the shades of grey, it has been pointed out that EU Member 
States consistently operated in the context of negotiations of international agreements in 
order to make these agreements compatible with the specific governance model of the 
EU
16
. Again, the importance of the European commitment to the respect and promotion 
                                                 
8
 Article 22 of the ILO Constitution. The CEACR is composed of 20 independent experts. See further 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/lang--
it/index.htm . 
9
 Article 24 of the ESC. The ECSR is composed of 15 independent experts. 
10
 Articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution. 
11
 Introduced by the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter of 1998. See further De Schutter, 
The Two Lives of the European Social Charter, in De Schutter (ed.), The European Social Charter: a 
Social Constitution for Europe, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 11-37, 2010, pp. 22 and ff. . 
12
 See De Burça, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2, 2013, 168-184, p. 183.  
13
 "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter" (emphasis added). 
14
 "The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its 
own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law" (emphasis added). 
15
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Journal 1, 1-51, 2011, p. 14. 
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4 
of international law has been called into question as being essentially "cost free". This 
finding is based in particular on the analysis stemming from the field of international 
agreements regarding military activities, since EU countries "largely refrain from using 
military force and pursue peaceful means to solve international disputes"
17
. Moreover, 
the EU approach to international agreements predating the Treaty of Rome (1958) or the 
accession to the EU of a given Member State is even stricter. The first paragraph of 
Article 351 TFEU
18
 seems to provide a "respectful" attitude towards these agreements, 
allowing Member States to justify the non-respect of EU law on the basis of the need to 
respect obligations stemming from them. However, the second paragraph clarifies that 
Member States having recourse to the exception of the first paragraph are then under the 
obligation to solve the conflict. Such an obligation means for the concerned Member 
State attempting to renegotiate the agreement and eventually, failing this avenue, to 
unilaterally denounce the instrument
19
. 
On this background one has to assess the relationship between the EU and the 
ILO. As it is well known, the EU is not part of the ILO
20
, nor is it possible for the EU 
itself to ratify ILO Conventions. Still, along its history, the EU
21
 has recognised an 
important role for the ILO in a number of occasions. Here I will refer to a few 
examples, following a chronological order. Thus, the first example comes straight from 
the founding years of the European Communities. Indeed, the so-called "Ohlin 
Report"
22
, which would provide the theoretical basis for the social policy chapter of the 
Rome Treaty, was drafted by a group of experts of the ILO. The main finding of the 
Report was that the creation of the European Communities and of the common market 
did not require the harmonisation of labour standards
23
. The impact of this finding on 
the competences granted by the Treaty of Rome is evident
24
. Now, in our present 
context it is perhaps interesting to point out that such a conclusion was supported by the 
existence of exchange rates between countries which reflected their different 
productivity
25
, but such an argument surely goes beyond the scope of this paper. The 
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(eds.), International Handbook of Informal Governance, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 421. 
25
 Ibidem, p. 104 and 114: "If, in a country with rapidly rising productivity, money incomes do not rise 
more or less in step with productivity its export prices will also fall and other countries will have to adopt 
5 
second stop of this quick journey is the 2006 Communication on Decent Work
26
. In this 
Communication one can find an echo of the aforementioned idea that EU standards for 
social rights already go beyond the international standards
27
. The most interesting point 
for the analysis carried out in this paper comes from the passage of the Communication 
devoted to Enlargement
28
. Here the Commission stressed the importance for candidate 
countries to implement the decent work agenda, and in particular ILO core standards
29
. 
The reference to those standards was also included in the part dealing with trade 
policy
30
. The final step provides a more recent reference, although contained in a simple 
press release. Commenting the adoption by the EU Council of a Decision authorising 
Member States to ratify ILO Convention No 189 (concerning fair and decent work for 
domestic workers), the EU Commission stated that "[t]he EU promotes, in all its 
policies, the ratification and effective implementation of ILO Conventions on core 
labour standards"
31
. 
Turning to the European Social Charter, one can see that, as De Schutter puts 
it
32
, this instrument never played an important role for the development of EU law in the 
social field, being seldom referred to. This notwithstanding the fact that the Treaties 
(now in Article 151 TFEU) explicitly mention the ESC in the chapter related to social 
policy
33
. As for the ILO, the EU is not part of the ESC. Though the Lisbon Treaty 
included the possibility/obligation for the EU to join the European Convention on 
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 COM(2006) 249, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Promoting decent work for all - The 
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 The reference here goes to those Conventions identified as fundamental by the 1998 ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, i.e. Conventions covering (a) freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation. 
30
 COM(2006) 249, see supra note 27, p. 8. On this point see further Vandenberghe, On Carrots and 
Sticks: The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policy, 13 European Foreign Affairs Review, 561-581, 2008, 
pp. 567-568. 
31
 European Commission, Working conditions: time for Member States to implement the ILO domestic 
workers convention, IP/14/82   28/01/2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
82_en.htm (last accessed 20/06/2014) 
32
 De Schutter, Le role de la Charte sociale européenne dans le dévelopement du droit de l'Union 
Européenne, in De Schutter (ed.), The European Social Charter: a Social Constitution for Europe, 
Bruylant, Bruxelles, 95-146 , 2010, p. 95. 
33
 Article 151 TFEU: "The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such 
as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the 
promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between 
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment 
and the combating of exclusion" (emphasis added). 
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Human Rights
34
 (ECHR), the ESC did not enjoy similar attention. In fact, the first 
reference to the ESC in the context of primary EU law dates back to the Single 
European Act (1986)
35
. What is more, in the same location the document explicitly 
mentions "social justice" as one of the "fundamental rights" which it sought to promote. 
After that, the possibility of accession by the EU to the ESC was envisaged at the 
moment of the revision of the Charter, taking place between 1990 and 1994. Indeed, the 
1994 draft of the Revised ESC included an Article (L) which paved the way for such 
accession
36
. However, the Article was dropped in the text which was ultimately 
adopted
37
. After this (missed) encounter, the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights
38
 (EUCFR) showed once again the distance between the EU and the ESC. 
Indeed, though the EUCFR makes explicit reference to the European Convention on 
Human Rights
39
, the ESC is never mentioned along the text. This notwithstanding the 
fact that several disposition of the EUCFR itself were directly inspired by similar 
Articles of the ESC, as stated in the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union
40
 redacted by the Praesidium of the European 
Convention
41
. 
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38
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, solemnly proclaimed on December the 7
th
 by 
the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon 
then clarified the legal status of the Charter, recognising to the rights, freedoms and principles contained 
therein the same legal value as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU). 
39
 Article 52(2) EUCFR: " In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection". 
40
 Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). 14.12.2007, No C 303. In particular Article 14 (Right 
to education), Article 15 (Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work), Article 23 
(Equality between women and men), Article 25 (the rights of the elderly), Article 26 (Integration of 
persons with disabilities), Article 27 (Workers' right to information and consultation within the 
undertaking), Article 28 (Right of collective bargaining and action), Article 29 (Right of access to 
placement services), Article 30 (Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal), Article 31 (Fair and just 
working conditions), Article 32 (Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work), 
Article 33 (Family and professional life), Article 34 (Social security and social assistance), Article 35 
(Health care).  
41
 "These explanations were originally prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention 
which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. They have been updated under 
7 
As it was just highlighted, the EU is not part of the ESC nor of (any Convention 
of) the ILO. However, the effects of its action do have an impact on the rights and 
values protected by the said legal orders. Hence, I will briefly look at the relationship 
the other way round, that is, from the "point of view" of the ESC and the ILO. The 
supervisory bodies of both systems have been confronted with the issue. They had to 
deliver their conclusions/decisions on a potential violation of the standard protected by 
the ESC or by ILO Conventions which was directly caused either by the application of  
EU law or by the action of EU institutions. On this background one can see that the 
supervisory bodies went on to scrutinise the situation in the Member State without 
awarding any special justification or presumption of conformity on the basis of the role 
of the EU in the issue
42
. In this sense the scrutiny was placed "downstream": the 
supervisory bodies did not scrutinise the EU law or the action of the EU per se but 
analysed instead the situation at the national level
43
. This analysis makes it evident that 
EU Member States find themselves between the proverbial rock and a hard place: on the 
one hand they must apply EU law
44
, on the other they are bound to the respect of the 
obligations stemming from international agreements they have ratified. 
All in all, the relationship emerging from this brief overview appears as a rather 
platonic one. Due to the impossibility of the EU to accede to these instruments, the legal 
orders of the ILO and the ESC are bound to ignore the role played by EU law and 
action when assessing the situation in the signatory countries. As for the EU, the 
                                                                                                                                               
the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention, in the light of the drafting adjustments 
made to the text of the Charter by that Convention (notably to Articles 51 and 52) and of further 
developments of Union law. Although they do not as such have the status of law, they are a valuable tool 
of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter".  
42
 European Committee of Social Rights, Decision on Admissibility and the Merits, 3 July 2013, Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v. 
Sweden, Complaint No. 85/2012, para 74: "neither the current status of social rights in the EU legal order 
nor the substance of EU legislation and the process by which it is generated would justify a general 
presumption of conformity of legal acts and rules of the EU with the European Social Charter". Cfr. the 
different stance of the European Court of Human Rights in this respect. European Court of Human 
Rights, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98, 
para. 165-166: "the [European] Court [of Human Rights] finds that the protection of fundamental rights 
by Community law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, “equivalent” […] to 
that of the Convention system […] In the Court's view, therefore, it cannot be said that the protection of 
the applicant company's Convention rights was manifestly deficient, with the consequence that 
the relevant presumption of Convention compliance by the respondent State has not been rebutted". 
43
 International Labour Conference, 99th Session, 2010, Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (The United Kingdom), 208-209, 209: "the 
Committee wishes to make clear that its task is not to judge the  correctness of the ECJ's holdings in  
Viking and  Laval  as they set out an interpretation of the European Union law, based  on varying and 
distinct rights in the Treaty of the European Community, but rather to examine whether the impact of 
these  decisions at national level are such as to deny workers' freedom of association rights under 
Convention No. 87" (emphasis added). Similarly in International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 
2013 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(Sweden), 178-179, 178. European Committee of Social Rights, supra note 43, para 72: "It is ultimately 
for the Committee to assess compliance of a national situation with the Charter, including when the 
transposition of a European Union directive into domestic law may affect the proper implementation of 
the Charter" (emphasis added). 
44
 Or comply with Memoranda of Understanding signed with the Troika which is in its turn composed for 
two third by EU institutions (the EU Commission and the European Central Bank), the last "third" being 
the International Monetary Fund. 
8 
possibility of a true commitment towards the ESC was ruled out by the preference for 
"self-sufficiency", i.e. for drafting its own instrument (the EUCFR). Though the 
relationship with the ILO is essentially as "platonic", the EU appears to recognise a 
higher "moral" role to ILO standards, in particular when it comes to its external 
relations. 
2. "Austerity" and International Standards for Social Rights 
 During the years of the Great Recession the concept (or at least, the term) of 
"austerity" has become a familiar one. Austerity is in itself a package of policies 
presented as a cure. A cure, as Nobel laureate Paul Krugman puts it, akin to the 
bleeding inflicted by middle-age "doctors" to their patients, with the implication that, 
improvements failing to materialise, the patient would have to undergo... more 
bleeding
45
. In very brief, austerity policies are a mix of cuts in public spending, 
privatisation, labour market de-regulation and wage moderation (or outright 
reduction
46
). The aims of those policies, at the risk of oversimplifying, are the reduction 
of public debt to GDP ratio, the reduction of public deficit to GDP and the improvement 
of competitiveness through internal devaluation
47
. Leaving ideological reasons aside 
(though they probably played a major role
48
), the choice in favour of the austerity-cure 
was dictated by a diagnosis of the Euro-crisis which saw "fiscal profligacy" (public 
expenditure, public debts) in the "periphery" as the cause of the said crisis
49
. As it 
should be obvious, this paper does not aim to analyse those policies per se or their 
actual outcome. However, one should add for the sake of completeness, that much of 
the public debt was in fact the result of bank bailouts (especially in Spain and Ireland
50
), 
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 Krugman, Bleeding Europe, The Conscience of a Liberal (Blog), 11 December 2012, available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/bleeding-europe (last accessed 20/06/2014): "it really is 
like medieval medicine, where you bled patients to treat their ailments, and when the bleeding made them 
sicker, you bled them even more". 
46
 As for the public sector and general minimum wage in Greece. See Karakioulafis, Grèce: Les syndicats 
dans la ligne de mire de la troika, 143-144 Chronique internationale de l’IRES, 121–132, 2013. 
47
 That is, lowering wages and labour costs in order for the "periphery" countries (in particular the so-
called GIPSI countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) to restore their competitiveness and 
heal their economic woes by moving into surplus (i.e. becoming net exporters of goods and services). On 
the point see Pochet and Degryse, The Programmed Dismantling of the European Social Model, 47 
Intereconomics 4, 200–217, 2012, p. 216; Roubini, Eurozone Crisis: Here Are the Options, Now Choose, 
EconoMonitor (Blog), 9 November 2011, available at 
http://www.economonitor.com/nouriel/2011/11/09/eurozone-crisis-well-at-least-we-have-options/ (last 
accessed 20/06/2014); Janssen, Internal Wage Devaluation - The IMF Admits It Does Not Work, Social 
Europe (Blog), 16 December 2013, available at http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/12/internal-wage-
devaluation/ (last accessed (20/06/2014).  
48
 Fazi, It’s Time To Stand Up To Troika Austerity (Part II), Social Europe (Blog), 19 June 2014, 
available at http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/06/time-stand-troika-austerity-part-ii/ (last accessed 
20/06/2014). 
49
 Degryse, Jepsen and Pochet, The Euro crisis and its impact on national and European social policies, 5 
ETUI Working Paper, 1-44, 2013, p. 14, available at http://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-
Papers/The-Euro-crisis-and-its-impact-on-national-and-European-social-policies (last accessed 
20/06/2014). 
50
 See for example Varoufakis, The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global 
Economy, London, Zed Books, 2013, p. 154; Degryse, “The new European economic governance”, 14 
9 
that the growing private financial inflows which financed the "profligacy" of the 
periphery had provided the needed demand to absorb the external surpluses of the so-
called "core" countries
51
 and that many of the GIPSI countries had in fact entered the 
Great Recession with low deficits and comparatively low level of public debts
52
. 
Indeed, the said crisis-narrative has been turned upside down even by ECB vice-
president Vitor Constancio in a relatively recent speak
53
. Still, austerity was the 
medicine of choice, and it is to its implementation in Greece that this section is devoted. 
 As it is well known, Greece occupies an unenviable first place in the sorry group 
of countries interested by austerity measures, and more precisely by Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU). The MoU lay down the conditions for obtaining financial help in 
the form of loans from the so-called Troika, formed by the EU Commission, by the 
ECB and by the IMF. Thus, as often along this paper, I will only provide a brief account 
of the measures imposed to Greece during the Great Recession
54
. In particular, I will 
focus on the measures which gave rise to those violations of international standards of 
protection of social rights which represent the main object of this section.  
 Labour law regulations and social security represent two of the topics most 
interested by "austerity" measures. On the individual side, two measures can be pointed 
out. First, the reduction of compensation due to dismissal, introduced by Law 
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3863/2010, and more specifically the provision of a "trial period" of 12 months. During 
such a period the employee has no right to compensation in case of dismissal. Second, 
the same law introduced the possibility to conclude "special apprenticeship contracts" of 
up to one year's duration with persons between 15 and 18 years. Those contracts are 
characterised by lower wages (70% of the minimum or daily wage), limited social 
security benefits and are excluded from the application of labour law provisions (except 
for health and safety provisions). This measure goes hand in hand with the general 
reduction of the minimum wage, which was more pronounced (32%) for young workers 
(under the age of 25). On the collective side, the whole Greek system of collective 
bargaining was deeply changed during the years of the Great Recession. Indeed, 
collective bargaining was directly affected by austerity measures from the very first 
Memorandum of Understanding
55
. Afterwards, Law 4024/2011 established a 
generalised priority for company level agreements, which would then prevail over a 
conflicting sectoral agreement, even if the latter is more favourable to the worker. The 
same law also suspended the possibility of extending erga omnes sectoral agreements, 
while also introducing the possibility to conclude company agreements with 
"association of workers" representing at least 3/5 of the workforce. The government 
also intervened directly upon the results of collective bargaining, for example by 
reducing the agreed minimum wage (of 22%) and by suspending clauses providing for 
wage increases relating to seniority for as long as unemployment is over 10%. Finally, 
turning to social security, the Greek government introduced several reductions to 
primary and auxiliary pensions
56
. In particular, those measures reduced holiday bonuses 
for pensioners (which were removed for pensions over 2500€ per month and for 
pensioners under 60 years); drastically cut pensions for pensioners being younger than 
60; levied a "social security contribution" from pensions over 1400€ per month, the rate 
of the contribution varying on a slide scale between 3% and 14%. 
2.1 Violations 
 Faced with this dire situation the Greek trade unions were particularly active in 
exploring the possibilities offered by international texts protecting social rights. It was 
this activism which set into motion the procedures which brought to the condemnations 
I will analyse in the next few paragraphs. 
 Already in September 2011 a High Level Mission of the ILO was sent to Greece 
in order to assess the respect of several Conventions following the adoption of austerity 
packages. The Report of the High Level Mission highlighted a number of issues in the 
areas of freedom of association and collective bargaining, wages, equality and non-
discrimination, social security, labour inspection and labour administration, 
employment policies. For the first area, the Mission expressed its concerns in particular 
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regarding the freeze in wage negotiations and the possibility for "association of 
workers" (as opposed to trade unions) to validly conclude collective agreements
57
. As 
regards wages, the most pressing critique was directed at the level of minimum wages 
which was falling dangerously close to the poverty line
58
. Finally, the High Level 
Mission openly criticised the fact that in the context of negotiations with the so-called 
Troika, employment objectives were rarely discussed
59
. The mission also noted that the 
impact of pension reforms (i.e. cuts) on poverty level had not been considered
60
. In 
2012
61
 the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
62
 (CFA) reviewed the Greek 
situation regarding Convention N° 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise) and 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining). The CFA 
further criticised the freeze on negotiations regarding wages, and more in general the 
"important and significant interventions in the voluntary nature of collective bargaining" 
going against the very principle of "inviolability of freely concluded collective 
agreements"
63
. The Committee moreover expressed its concerns regarding the 
possibility for "association of persons" to conclude collective agreements, noting in 
particular that those associations would not offer the same guarantees of independence 
than trade unions
64
. The concerns on this point are also expressed in the most recent 
Report of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR)
65
. The CEACR based these concerns on statistics showing 
a staggering prevalence of company-level collective agreements concluded with said 
"association of persons", with a vast majority of those agreements providing for wage 
cuts
66
.  
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 Turning to the European Social Charter, the complaint raised by the Greek trade 
union were aimed at the special apprenticeship contracts
67
, the compensation-free 
dismissal during the trial period
68
 and the pension reform
69
. In all these decisions, the 
European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) ultimately found the austerity measures 
adopted by the Greek government to be in breach of one or more Articles of the 
European Social Charter. Thus, the "special apprenticeship contracts" violated Articles 
Article 4§1
70
, 7§7
71
, 10§2
72
 and 12§3
73
 of the ESC. The ECSR found that those 
contracts did not respect the right to a fair remuneration inasmuch as they provided for a 
wage lower than the poverty line
74
, while they also violated the right of young persons 
to protection since they did not provide the minimum level of three weeks' annual paid 
leave
75
. Furthermore, the legal framework for these contracts did not mandate any form 
of training and was hence considered by the ECSR as violating the right to vocational 
training for boys and girls
76
. Finally, the apprenticeship contracts only included a very 
limited access to social security benefits, a situation which, in the words of the ECSR 
had "the practical effect of establishing a distinct category of workers who are 
effectively excluded from the general range of protection offered by the social security 
system at large"
77
. Thus, the measure was also found in breach of the right to social 
security. The second object of complaint was the possibility to dismiss a worker without 
notice and/or compensation (severance pay) during the first twelve months of an open-
ended contract. The ECSR found this measure to be in breach of Article 4§4
78
 of the 
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ESC. The ECSR considered the absence of a period of notice and of a form of 
compensation to be in contrast with the ESC, where it provides for a right of all workers 
to a reasonable period of notice. In particular the ECSR stressed that the concept of "all 
workers" includes those on trial period, reinforcing its reasoning by noting a contrario 
that immediate dismissal could only be accepted in cases of serious misconduct
79
. 
Coming to pensions, the five complaints are essentially identical, having being brought 
against a series of measures adopted by the Greek government with the general aim, as I 
briefly described supra, of cutting pension benefits. In all these cases the ECSR 
considered the Greek measures as violating Article 12§3
80
 of the ESC. However, it must 
be stressed that in these decisions the stance of the ECSR was more nuanced, opting for 
a rather procedural critique, in lieu of the more substantial one delivered in the 
previously presented ones. True enough, the ECSR found that the cumulative effect of 
the measures at stake was "bound to bring about a significant degradation of the 
standard of living and the living conditions of many of the pensioners concerned"
81
. 
However, it went on to criticise in particular the lack of research and analysis on the 
impact of these measures, the absence of discussion with the organisations concerned 
and the disregard for other possible measures which could have limited the said 
cumulative impact
82
. 
 It is interesting to note that, in all those procures, both in the context of the ILO 
and of the ESC, the Greek government tried to defend itself "hiding" behind the 
obligations contained in the Memoranda. This line of defence was not particularly 
successful. Though the different bodies of the ILO and the ECSR recognised the 
difficult situation of the Greek government, they nonetheless considered the adopted 
measures to be in violation of the respective international standards. In the pensions' 
decisions the ECSR was particularly clear in this regard, affirming that "the fact that the 
contested provisions of domestic law seek to fulfil the requirements of other legal 
obligations does not remove them from the ambit of the Charter"
83
 since "when states 
parties agree on binding measures, which relate to matters within the remit of the 
Charter, they should -both when preparing the text in question and when implementing 
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it into national law- take full account of the commitments they have taken upon 
ratifying the European Social Charter"
84
. Furthermore, the ECSR added that "it is 
ultimately for the Committee to assess compliance of a national situation with the 
Charter, including when the implementation of the parallel international obligations into 
domestic law may interfere with the proper implementation of those emanating from the 
Charter ambit of the Charter", confirming its "downstream" position when assessing 
national measures implementing other international obligations. What it is interesting in 
the Report of the ILO High Level Mission to Greece is the symmetric position of the 
representatives of the EU Commission. Indeed, in the wording of the Report we are told 
that "the policy choices were always made by the Greek Government"
85
 and that the 
European Commission exerted no "pressure to violate ratified international labour 
Conventions"
86
. Now, though one may be relived to read this reassurance from the EU 
Commission, such a stance allows the Commission to "wash its hands" of the whole 
matter of respecting international standards of protections of social rights. At the same 
time, it provides the best justification for the approach of the ECSR and the CEACR to 
these issues, namely to examine the national implementation of measures agreed in the 
context of MoU or of EU acts without providing any presumption of conformity with 
the respective standards. 
3. Social Rights, the EU Internal Market and the Court of Justice 
 The decisions delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in the Viking
87
 and Laval
88
 also need no particular introduction. Indeed, these "evil 
twins" have sparked a gargantuan debate among scholars
89
. Borrowing the words of the 
(relatively) recent Report "A New Strategy for the single Market" redacted by Mario 
Monti at the demand of President Barroso, these cases "revived an old split that had 
never been healed: the divide between advocates of greater market integration and those 
who feel that the call for economic freedoms and for breaking up regulatory barriers is 
code for dismantling social rights protected at national level"
90
. As it happens, these 
decisions ended up also as (indirect) object of review from the CEACR
91
 and the 
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ECSR
92
. Before passing to conclusions/decisions delivered by those bodies, I will 
however highlight a few fundamental points of Viking and Laval which are mandatory 
to fully understand the procedures in front of the said supervisory bodies. 
 The Viking and Laval cases concerned a conflict between one of the so-called 
"fundamental freedoms"
93
 of the EU internal market
94
 and the right to take collective 
action
95
. In both cases the Court was required to rule, leaving aside a good number of 
details, whether a restriction to a fundamental freedom resulting from a collective 
action initiated by trade unions against a private undertaking was permitted under EU 
(primary) law. Although the right to take collective action was for the first time 
recognised as a fundamental one in these cases
96
, the CJEU analysed its exercise from a 
formal point of view as a (mere) restriction to a fundamental freedom of the internal 
market. Having decided for this approach, the Court of Justice applied a rather 
"standardised" reasoning, considering whether it was possible to justify such a 
restriction. In very brief, the said collective action should a) pursue a legitimate aim 
compatible with the Treaty and b) be justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest, c) on condition that the action is carried out in a way suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary in order 
to attain it
97
. The actual outcome of the cases is not particularly important for the 
present paper. In Viking the CJEU found that the collective action passed steps (a) and 
(b) of the test, sending the case back to the national court, although with a rather clear 
guidance, for the assessment of point (c) (the so-called proportionality test stricto 
sensu). The dispute was ultimately settled privately, the content of the settlement itself 
remaining confidential. In Laval the collective action was found wanting under point (b) 
of the test. The issues however lie in the very approach concocted by the CJEU to tackle 
the conflict between the (fundamental) right to take collective action and the 
fundamental freedoms of the internal market. To consider just two critiques to this 
approach, the stance was criticised because, by considering the right to take collective 
action through the restriction/justification scheme, it suggested a hierarchical relation 
between fundamental social rights and fundamental freedoms of the internal market, 
with the latter enjoying a higher ground than the former
98
. Secondly, the principle of 
proportionality (embodied by the third step of the test outlined before) was criticised as 
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being essentially illogic, provided that the more a collective action is successful, the 
more it will infringe on the economic freedoms of an employer, the less likely it would 
be for the action to pass the proportionality test
99
. It is worth mentioning these critiques, 
among the host which has been flung at the twin decisions, inasmuch as they will be 
confirmed by the decisions/conclusions of the CEACR and the ECSR which will soon 
be presented. 
 Beyond the approach delivered by the CJEU, it is relevant in the context of this 
paper to look at the sources referred to in order to affirm the fundamental nature of the 
right to take collective action. Indeed, in both decisions the Court of Justice cites a 
number of international texts
100
, including the European Social Charter and Convention 
No 87 of the ILO. Now, along the decisions, and in particular when assessing the 
possible limitations to the newly found fundamental right, the CJEU never refers to the 
body of decisions elaborated by the respective monitoring bodies. However, the same 
Court of Justice is definitely aware of the existence and of the importance of this (sui 
generis) "case law"
101
, since, as it is well known, the text of ILO Convention No 87 
never mentions the right to take collective action, or the right to strike for what it 
matters. In fact the right to take collective action has been considered as included under 
the protection of the freedom of association by... the ILO supervisory bodies
102
. Still, 
the CJEU did not feel the need to mention this contribution. More in general, the Court 
of Justice appears particularly recalcitrant when it comes to referring to other sources of 
human or fundamental rights law and "jurisprudence"
103
. 
3.1 Violations 
 The impact of the decisions of the CJEU in Viking and Laval came under the 
scrutiny of both the CEACR and ECSR. In fact, the CEACR analysed these impacts 
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twice, the first time because of a collective dispute
104
 (the so-called BALPA case) and 
the second because of a national reform aimed at "implementing" the decision of 
Laval
105
. The ECSR only analysed the latter impact
106
. 
 In all these occasions the approach developed by the CJEU and summarised 
before was openly criticised. As I explained in Section 1, this was done through the 
critique of the national situation. Still, the critique of the role of EU law and of the 
CJEU is as explicit as possible provided the context. 
 The BALPA dispute
107
 arose in the context of negotiations between British 
Airways and the British Air Line Pilots’ Association (BALPA). British Airways was 
planning to launch a wholly owned subsidiary airline that would operate between Paris 
and (among others) the US. Along with this operation, the process of collective 
bargaining started: the thorny issue revolved around the working conditions to apply to 
the workers of the subsidiary. In very brief, negotiations failed and no agreement was 
reached. BALPA then called for strike action, holding a ballot which turned out in 
favour of collective action. The company held that any strike action would be unlawful 
because of the doctrine developed by the CJEU in the Viking case, since the action 
would violate its freedom of establishment. The main threat revolved around a claim for 
unlimited damages, estimated by the company at £100 million per day. Such a "life-
threatening" amount forced the trade union to cancel the collective action. At this point 
BALPA lodged a complaint before the CEACR, being joined by the International 
Transport Federation (ITF). The CEACR delivered its conclusions on the dispute in the 
occasion of the 2010 Report. Also in this occasion, the defence of "hiding behind the 
EU" was deployed
108
 (in casu by the UK government). To this the CEACR responded 
with the stance outlined before, that is, by placing its scrutiny "downstream". In the 
words of the conclusions: "the Committee wishes to make clear that its task is not to 
judge the correctness of the ECJ's holdings in Viking and Laval as they set out an 
interpretation of the European Union law, based on varying and distinct rights in the 
Treaty of the European Community, but rather to examine whether the impact of these 
decisions at national level are such as to deny workers' freedom of association rights 
under Convention No. 87"
109
. Still, notwithstanding this rather careful approach, the 
CEACR clearly concluded against the application of the principle of proportionality to 
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the right
110
 to take collective action
111
. Indeed, one cannot but observe that the critique 
to the case law of the CJEU was not so careful, since the CEACR concluded that "the 
doctrine that is being articulated in these ECJ
112
 judgements is likely to have a 
significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike in practice in a manner 
contrary to the Convention"
113
. 
  The same critiques were repeated almost verbatim in the conclusions related to 
the so-called Lex Laval
114
. The Lex Laval being the nickname for a package of 
amendments
115
 introduced by the Swedish government enacted in order to bring the 
Swedish system in line with the Laval decision. These amendments try to "integrate" the 
points raised by the CJEU decision into the Swedish system, while keeping intact the 
fundamental characteristics of the system. The whole issue is strictly connected with the 
distinct topic of posting of workers, which goes well beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Fortunately, the statements delivered by the CEACR and by the ECSR when 
assessing the Lex Laval can be analysed without entering the minefield of posting. Of 
the critiques raised by the CEACR I have already said. These are essentially a repetition 
of the ones regarding the BALPA dispute. The substance of the decision delivered by 
the ECSR
116
 is also similar. Repetitive it may be, it is also worth stressing that the 
"hiding behind the EU" argument was once again put forward by the defendant 
government (Sweden)
117
. And, once again, was dismissed, this time by the ECSR, on 
the ground that it is the conformity of the resulting national law with the ESC that has to 
be assessed by the Committee
118
. In this context the ECSR also refused to award EU a 
"special treatment", in the form of a presumption of conformity with the ESC
119
. As for 
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the more substantial points, the ECSR completely reverses the logic of the approach 
delivered by the CJEU, by affirming that the restrictions to the right to collective action 
should be proportionate
120
, since these restrictions have to be assessed from the point of 
view of Article G of the ESC
121
. Finally, the ECSR seems to agree with the critiques 
aimed the hierarchy between fundamental freedoms and fundamental social rights de 
facto created by the decisions of the CJEU. Hence, the Committee feels appropriate to 
remind that "consequently, the facilitation of free cross-border movement of services 
and the promotion of the freedom of an employer or undertaking to provide services in 
the territory of other States – which constitute important and valuable economic 
freedoms within the framework of EU law – cannot be treated, from the point of view of 
the system of values, principles and fundamental rights embodied in the Charter, as 
having a greater a priori value than core labour rights, including the right to make use of 
collective action to demand further and better protection of the economic and social 
rights and interests of workers"
122
. 
To conclude this gallery of violations, it seems useful to add yet another 
potential clash, though this ultimately failed to materialise. Following the critiques 
against Viking and Laval, a legislative solution was proposed in 2012 by the EU 
Commission. The solution, in itself a proposal for a new EU Regulation
123
, was never 
adopted, following the impossibility to find the necessary support among Member 
States
124
. This premature death notwithstanding, two strictly intertwined points are 
worth mentioning in the context of the present Section. First, in the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the Proposal, the aforementioned Conclusions delivered 
by the CEACR in the BALPA case are explicitly referred to. This shows at the very 
least the awareness on the EU Commission's side of the violation of ILO standards 
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caused by the application of Viking and Laval
125
. However, coming to the second 
element, the Proposal itself refers to the principle of proportionality, as the tool to 
reconcile the exercise the right (or freedom) to take collective action and the freedom of 
establishment and to provide services
126
. Going beyond the mere reference, the actual 
stance of the CEACR about this very principle seems somewhat lost on the 
Commission. 
4. Scenario 1: Beyond Fair-weather Friendship? 
 As it should be evident, the violations outlined highlights first and foremost a 
political problem. To this however I will only devote a few comments in the closing 
Section of the paper. Here I will stick to the legal approach, in order to analyse "the road 
not taken". In this sense I will look to those instruments already present in EU law 
which could have allowed (and could still allow, at the low price of a change of mind) a 
more clear commitment to the respect of the international standards described before. 
This choice (de jure condito) must be considered as opposed to a more "creative" one, 
which would consist in proposing legal changes (de jure condendo), e.g. the accession 
of the EU to the ESC. In this sense, I will analyse the possibilities offered by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and by Article 351 TFEU.  
This approach is not without drawbacks. The major one is related to the issues 
analysed in Section 2. This is due to the legal nature of MoU, which are considered as 
simple declarations. As it was stressed before, the EU Commission considers the Greek 
state to be the sole responsible for the political choices implementing the various MoU, 
and the violation of the conditions would "only" cause the interruption of the loan. In 
fact, an attempt to pierce this veil was made by the Tribunal do Trabalho of Porto 
(Portugal). The Tribunal sent a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, asking 
whether the principles of equality and non-discrimination
127
 and of fair and just working 
conditions
128
 recognised by the EUCFR were being violated by the decision of the 
Portuguese Govrnment to cut wages in the public sector
129
. The CJEU simply affirmed 
its lack of jurisdiction on the matter
130
. Thus, it remains extremely unclear whether the 
EUCFR is applicable to MoU. However, and this is why the present discussion remains 
interesting also for the issues highlighted in Section 2, it can be argued that the EUCFR 
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still binds EU Institutions even when acting in their role of "Troika members"
131
. This is 
nothing but reinforced by the fact that EU Institutions compose two thirds of the said 
Troika. 
The first "window" allowing EU Institutions to fully (and legally) commit to the 
respect of international standards set by ILO Conventions and by the ESC is Article 53 
EUCFR. The window however is definitely a narrow one. Article 53 EUCFR states that 
the Charter itself shall not be interpreted "as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, 
by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, 
the Community or all the Member States are party". Hence, it could be argued, in 
situation in which the EUCFR does apply, it should be interpreted in a way which is 
compatible with "international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all 
the Member States are party". As for example, all Member States have ratified ILO 
Convention No 87, which was at stake both in the Greek context (regarding the reform 
of the system of collective bargaining)  and in the CJEU decisions in Viking and Laval. 
The situation is less clear for the ESC. This is due to the peculiar nature of the 
instrument, first signed in 1961 and then revised in 1996. Some Member States have 
only ratified the first version of the ESC, some have ratified both and another group of 
states only has ratified the revised version. The situation is summarised by the Table 
below. 
Instrument Member States 
Only ESC (1961) Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic,  
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Only RevESC (1996) Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia 
Both Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden 
 
In a recent contribution, a member of the ECSR has argued in favour of the 
interpretation of the ESC as falling into the category of treaties signed by all Member 
States and hence covered by Article 53 EUCFR
132
. Still, as it was stressed before, the 
possibility to look through this "window" presupposes a legal dispute where the EUCFR 
is applied. 
The second window is quite wider. The problem in this case is what lies outside. 
Article 351 TFEU explicitly provides the tools to solve a conflict between EU law and 
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international treaties concluded before the accession to the EU
133
. Hence, the question 
would be one of chronological order. Each ILO Convention has obviously a different 
date of adoption and (for each Member State) ratification, so that it would be hard to 
provide an easy answer. Looking at the aforementioned ILO Convention 87, one can see 
that all Member States save Italy and Luxembourg
134
 have ratified it before the 
accession to the EU. 
 For the ESC the 
picture is more complicated, 
due to the said "dual" nature 
of the instrument, with the 
Revised ESC being ratified at 
a much later date. It has been 
argued
135
 that, in the case of a 
Member State having ratified 
both instruments, the 
ratification date of the 
Revised ESC would be the 
one to take into account, 
hence "resetting" the clock in 
respect of Article 351 TFEU. 
However, the contrary stance 
was maintained by the ETUC 
in its submission to the ECSR 
in the Lex Laval case
136
, 
arguing in favour of a 
"continuity" of the two 
instruments. Once again, the situation can be summarised with a Table. Hence, a fairly 
large group of Member States could invoke the first paragraph of Article 351 TFEU in 
order to protect the rights and obligations covered by the ESC and by (certain) ILO 
Conventions from the effects of EU law. This is particularly interesting in respect of the 
issues identified in Section 3. As for Section 2 and the MoU, the rather disturbing 
impression is that an eventual successful invocation of international instruments 
protecting social rights would simply force the given government to "cut" elsewhere. Or 
it would stop the payment of the loan linked to the application of the MoU in question. 
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  Before EU 
Accession 
After EU 
Accession 
Only ESC (1961) Austria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic,  
Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain, United 
Kingdom 
Germany, 
Luxembourg 
Only RevESC 
(1996) 
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia 
  
Both (reset) Cyprus Belgium, 
Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal, 
Sweden 
Both (continuity) Cyprus, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta, 
Sweden 
Belgium, 
France, Italy, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal 
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Another problem arises when one looks further than the first paragraph of Article 351. 
In order to keep up the suspense, I will come back to this issue in Section 5. 
4.1 A Short Deviation to Strasbourg 
 In developing this paper I have decided to look to the legal systems of the ILO 
and the ESC. This choice was based on their "specialisation" in the field of social rights 
and of their correlation with the concept of social justice. In this sense, the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) remains outside the scope of the present analysis. However, the ECtHR 
may have a role to play also in lending its superior "strength" to the more specialised 
bodies supervising the application of the ESC and of ILO Conventions. 
 The first and most evident basis for this strength stems from the obligation of the 
EU to accede to the ECHR contained in the Lisbon Treaty and now in Article 6 TEU
137
. 
The eventual accession will in fact shape the relationship between the two apical 
European Courts. Before that, it remains to both systems, through the case law of the 
respective Courts, to define their relationship
138
. However, four years have passed since 
the commitment to such accession was included in the Treaties. A draft of the accession 
protocol was published
139
, but then the negotiations faced a sudden stop, due to the 
afterthoughts of some Member States. Two years after, an agreement was reached over 
the draft accession instrument
140
, which is now awaiting the opinion of the Court of 
Justice. 
The second basis justifying the assumption of a major "strength" on the ECtHR 
side lies in the EUCFR. Indeed, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly refers 
to the ECHR in Article 52§3
141
. In the words of the Explanations provided by the 
Praesidium
142
, this Article is meant "to ensure the necessary consistency between the 
Charter and the ECHR by establishing the rule that, in so far as the rights in the present 
Charter also correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of 
those rights, including authorised limitations, are the same as those laid down by the 
ECHR". The Explanations make it clear that this reference includes the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Explanations have no binding legal value, though 
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they are "a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the 
Charter". Following this "valuable tool" it would seem that the rights recognized by the 
EUCFR should be interpreted as providing at least the same level of protection granted 
by the case law of the ECtHR. 
It remains to see how this "strength" can be used in support of the supervisory 
bodies mentioned before. The tool lies in the Demir and Baykara
143
 decision where the 
ECtHR opened an important channel to the corpus of decisions of the ECSR
144
 and of 
other supervisory bodies, as the CEACR
145
. The ECtHR referred to the interpretation 
provided by those bodies of their respective international agreements (ILO Conventions 
and the European Social Charter), in order to assess the emerging consensus (and the 
"continuous evolution") regarding the rights protected by the ECHR
146
. In casu such 
emerging consensus brought the ECtHR to consider the right to bargain collectively as 
an "essential element" of the right to form and join trade unions
147
, protected by Article 
11 ECHR
148
. 
The obstacle on this deviation through Strasbourg is represented by a certain 
deference which the ECtHR shows when dealing with EU law. This approach is 
epitomised by the Bosphorus
149
 case, where the ECtHR considered that EU law enjoyed 
a "presumption of conformity" with respect to the ECHR
150
. Still, the possible 
complementary role of the ECtHR in completing the protection of fundamental social 
rights was probably suggested implicitly by the ECSR in its decisions in the Greek 
pensions' cases which were described in Section 2, where it affirmed that "the 
Committee considers that other mechanisms are more suited to address complaints 
relating to the effects of the contested legislation on individual pensioners’ right to 
property"
151
. 
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5. Scenario 2: a different EU Exceptionalism? 
 The interest for this second scenario has been triggered by the reactions of EU 
institutions to the condemnations and concerns described so far. For the issues 
examined in Section 2 (austerity in Greece), these "reactions" amounts to... nothing. 
Neither the EU Commission nor the ECB have so much as commented on the number 
of concerns raised by the ILO High Level Mission. Even more problematic, the same 
silence met the direct condemnations which have been delivered by the ECSR, the CFA 
and the CEACR. This is in fact coherent with the logic one can observe in the statement 
of the EU Commission in the context of the ILO High Level Mission
152
, which basically 
reads as: we never told Greece to violate any international standard of protection for 
social rights. The same approach has been clarified in the second MoU with Greece, 
were it is reaffirmed that "the ownership of the programme and all executive 
responsibilities in the programme implementation remain with the Greek 
Government"
153
. One might say that this approach conflicts with the self-representation 
delivered by the EU Commission during the application of the MoU in Greece, based 
on the idea that "[t]he EU promotes, in all its policies, the ratification and effective 
implementation of ILO Conventions on core labour standards"
154
. However, from a 
legal point of view this is not a particularly strong argument. As regards the issues 
analysed in Section 3, the follow-up from the EU Commission was in its turn even more 
puzzling, even though the different topic is not as shocking and far reaching as the 
question of austerity policies. As it was highlighted before, the legislative proposal 
which should have solved the problems created by Viking and Laval relied on a legal 
approach extremely similar to the one explicitly criticised (at the time of the proposal) 
by the CEACR, and later also by the ECSR. In front of the condemnations and concerns 
presented in this paper, the EU Commission (in particular) and the ECB remained rather 
relaxed, and any change of approach was implicit (and difficult to discern at that) at 
best, nonexistent at worst. 
 This is why looking at the possibilities offered by Article 351 TFEU is 
ultimately disturbing. The first paragraph was described in the previous Section. As I 
said, a Member State having ratified the ESC or a given ILO Convention before the 
accession to the EU could theoretically invoke Article 351 TFEU in order to immunise 
certain rights from the effects of EU law. However, in such an hypothesis, the ultimate 
outcome could go in the very contrary direction than the one envisaged before, i.e. 
reaffirming the commitment of the EU to the respect of international standards of 
protection of social rights. This possibility stems from the second paragraph of Article 
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351 TFEU, which states that, in our hypothesis "the Member State or States concerned 
shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established". This 
process may take three different directions: a) a change in the policies of the given 
Member State; b) a change on the side of EU law and action; c) a change on the side of 
the ESC or the ILO. Now, the first possibility is only available for the issues regarding 
austerity policies in Greece, since the tensions caused by the case law of the CJEU stem 
from the interpretation by an independent judge of EU primary law –both elements 
which are beyond the reach of a single Member State (or a small group of Member 
States for what it matters
155
). As regards austerity policies, outcome (a) is in a way the 
most likely. The respect of international standards of protection of social rights would 
just add the umpteenth constraint to the action of the Greek Government, which could in 
its turn find other measures to appease the Troika. Solutions (b) and (c) are evidently 
much more difficult to achieve. In the case of the CJEU decisions, outcome (b) would 
require nothing less than a change of the Treaties. In the case of Greek austerity, it 
would require for the EU institutions which are part of the Troika to take into account 
the critiques and/or condemnations outlined before and modify the MoU accordingly. 
Their stance so far suggests that this possibility is indeed remote. Outcome (c) requires 
a very broad international consensus in order to intervene on the agreements in 
question, so that it appears even more remote. 
 However, the three possibilities just highlighted may all end up as dead ends. In 
such a situation the case law of the CJEU has already clarified that the given Member 
State(s) would have to denounce the international agreement conflicting with EU law
156
. 
For the ESC this could be achieved more easily, since the Charter allows for the 
"selective" ratification of its Articles
157
. ILO Convention No 87 would put up a fiercer 
fight in this regard. Indeed, its inclusion in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work
158
 makes its respect an obligation directly stemming from 
the membership of the ILO itself. It seems safe to affirm that the eventuality of EU 
Member States being forced to leave en masse the ILO is almost unthinkable, though 
the years of the Great Recession, characterised by a sort of continuous "EU state of 
emergency"
159
, somewhat changed our perception of what is "unthinkable" in Europe
160
. 
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 The "European exceptionalism" (in fact, the EU exceptionalism) mentioned in 
the title of this Section has generally been affirmed from a different point of view. In 
particular, several authors have highlighted the exceptionalism of the EU with respect of 
the tension between the regional economic integration and the participation in 
international agreements and bodies devoted to international trade
161
 (GATT, WTO). It 
may sound quite ironic in light of the analysis carried out so far, but the European 
exceptionalism has also been identified in the tendency to neglect "international law 
obligations" in order to maintain a high level of social protection
162
. Here one is 
confronted with the very opposite, as the EU neglects international commitments to 
social rights in order to pursue a closer economic integration via the internal market (the 
CJEU decisions) or to manage the crisis of a given Member State (austerity in Greece). 
 The seminal contributions which have described the "American exceptionalism" 
have identified a number of manifestations of this approach to public international 
law
163
. The most extreme of these manifestations, in the hierarchy developed by Koh, is 
the one called "double standards", which characterises the situation in which a country 
(in casu the US) advocates the application of different rules to other countries than to 
itself. In this sense it could be argued that the apparent disregard of EU institutions for 
the rights and obligations stemming from ILO Conventions falls in this category. 
Indeed, the EU considers the same ILO Conventions as a fundamental element both in 
its trade policy and in evaluating a candidate country for accession
164
. Hence the double 
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standard could be identified in the tension between internal and external commitment to 
international labour standards
165
.  
One could also focus on the discrepancy between the self-representation of the 
EU, which was highlighted in Section 1, and the lack of reaction to the violations 
highlighted so far. Clearly, this should not be qualified as "exceptionalism", 
representing more a political embarrassment than an exceptionalist approach to 
international commitments
166
.   
6. Perspectives 
 The boring positivistic definition of social justice proposed in the Introduction 
has evidently been construed ad hoc. Even worse, it was identified ex post, meaning that 
it was meant to be breached. Hence, I claim no particular value from this finding. 
Indeed, in the age of austerity, the EU appears rather unconcerned by its failure to 
pursue social justice thus defined. What makes this finding more interesting is exactly 
the very minimalist nature of the aforementioned definition. International standards of 
protection of social rights should be considered as representing a minimum level. Hence 
it may not be completely unfounded to consider the respect of this level as a necessary 
stepping stone towards social justice. This is why Section 4 represents the road not 
taken, by showing that legal instruments to take into account these standards in a more 
convincing way are already in place.  
Now, in the previous Section I outlined four possible outcomes when a conflict 
between EU law and action and an international agreement breaks out under Article 351 
TFEU. These possibilities were a) a change in the policies of the given Member State; 
b) a change on the side of EU law and action; c) a change on the side of the ESC or the 
ILO. To this however one should add another possibility, which would sound like "d) 
ignore the conflict with international standards of protection for social rights". This 
possibility is in fact the first which comes to the mind looking at the issue with a realist 
mindset. International standards of protection of social rights! How many divisions have 
they got? And the pragmatic answer, taking into account the sheer disproportion in the 
arsenal of sanctions between the ILO, the ESC
167
 and the CJEU or, even worse, the loan 
facility dependent upon the respect of the MoU, would be: not many.  
However, in concluding this rather bleak picture, it should be added that one can 
find some reaction of at least one EU institution. On the 13
th
 of March2014 two reports 
were adopted by the European Parliaments, one on "Employment and social aspects of 
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the role and operations of the Troika"
168
 and the other on "Role and operations of the 
Troika with regard to the euro area programme countries"
169
. Both Reports mention the 
ESC, and both do so by affirming that, on the basis of Article 151 TFEU, "action taken 
by the EU and its Member States must be consistent with the fundamental social rights 
laid down in the 1961 European Social Charter". What is more, the Report on 
Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika mentions the 
condemnations highlighted in Section 2
170
 and refers to the necessity to restore the 
respect of international obligations stemming from ILO Conventions and from the 
ESC
171
. Still, the Report "Role and operations of the Troika with regard to the euro area 
programme countries" confirmed the idea that MoU are situated outside the scope of EU 
law, by regretting "that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
European Social Charter, due to the fact that they are not based on Union primary law". 
In this sense, the concerns and condemnations delivered by the ILO supervisory bodies 
as well as by the ECSR seem to have contributed in providing the political legitimacy to 
condemn (or at least criticise) those very same policies they could not overturn through 
legal means. On the contrary, the condemnations described in Section 3 were less 
successful in shaping the solution to the Viking and Laval decisions, as showed by the 
brief account of the short-lived Monti II proposal
172
. Thus framed, the question leaves 
its legal aspects in the background to become one of legitimacy. Hence, the de minimis 
"social justice" definition plays a different role in highlighting the problem of 
legitimacy in the "output"
173
 of the EU action, which is not be able to respect the 
standards set by the ILO and by the ESC. In this light, one can also stress an interesting 
correlation between these shortcomings in output legitimacy and the recent 
advancement on the input one. That is, in reducing the democratic deficit of the EU. The 
ultimate choice of the EU Council in favour of Mr. Juncker, one of the 
Spitzencandidaten of the recent European elections goes in this sense. The same can be 
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said for the recommendations of the EP Report "Role and operations of the Troika with 
regard to the euro area programme countries", which raises a milder critique to the 
output of the Troika programmes focusing instead on the need to further involve the 
European Parliament in adjustment programmes by bringing MoU under the umbrella 
of EU law and community method
174
. 
 Alas, closing this paper with a legal point of view brings about a rather 
depressing note. As I just described, there are calls to improve the input legitimacy of 
EU action by bringing MoU under the rule of EU law. In both EP Reports, this move 
was identified as able to guarantee the application, among others, of ILO Conventions 
and of the ESC. However, such an application can only be foreseen, leaving aside de 
jure condendo solutions
175
, on the basis of a radical change of approach of the CJEU to 
these sources. Rather than merely referring to the texts of these instruments, the Court 
of Justice should then take into account the corpus of decision delivered by the 
supervisory bodies of ILO Conventions and of the ESC. At the peak of the Euro-crisis, 
an un-elected EU institution stepped up in order to (try to) avoid the collapse of the 
Eurzone. It would be now for the CJEU to do "whatever it takes" in order to preserve 
the possibility for this small measure of social justice. To keep up with the promise of a 
depressing ending I will just add that, in light of the decisions in Viking and Laval, this 
scenario appears unlikely at best. 
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